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Abstract
We build a model to investigate the interaction between trade, the supply of
law and order, and the nature of governing political institutions. To supply law
and order necessary for a representative merchant to create wealth, a ruler (i)
appoints officials capable of coercion and (ii) introduces a system of taxation.
When potential gains from trade are important, the demand for law and order
is high but appointing numerous officials capable of coercion may pave the way
to arbitrary and distortive expropriation. Delegating the task of appointing offi-
cials to the better-informed merchant lowers the cost of sustaining good market
institutions, but exacerbates the latter’s temptation to escape taxation. When
gains from trade are instead low delegation never occurs. Our theory provides a
rationale for the case of post-Norman Conquest England (1066-1307) where, in
parallel with the rise of trade, kings increasingly give in to the citizens’ desire of
self-governance by granting Charters of Liberties.
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Sheriffs and reeves, whose office was justice and judgment, were more ter-
rible than thieves and plunderers, and more savage than the most savage.
Henry of Huntingdon (c. 1088 - c. 1154), in Bisson [2008], p. 178.
1 Introduction
Much work has been devoted to the causes and consequences of political institutions
(see North and Thomas [1973], Greif et al. [1994], and Acemoglu and Robinson [2000,
2001]). It emerges that the power-holders’ inability to commit not to expropriate citi-
zens is central to understanding institutional dynamics, and that political institutions
– here to be interpreted as enfranchisement of the citizenry – often serve the purpose of
making expropriation less tempting. A natural question that also arises when studying
institutional choices is that of the provision of market supporting institutions, in par-
ticular law and order such as courts and the police (Dixit [2003], Besley and Persson
[2009]), and increasing attention has being paid to the interaction between both kinds
of institutions (Greif [2005], Acemoglu and Robinson [2006], North et al. [2009]).1
We contribute to this literature by providing a novel and formal theory based on
three observations. First, the demand for law and order is high when trade is important.
Second, for this demand to be met, there must exist a bureaucracy capable of coercion.
Third, a bureaucracy capable of coercion is also capable of expropriation. We build a
model that shows how the issue of controlling law enforcers is relevant to the design
of political institutions and, in turn, to the design of market institutions necessary for
society to create wealth.2
1See also Cervellati et al. [2008] on the interaction between institutions designed to protect the
citizenry against expropriation by the ruler on the one hand, and the protection of property rights
amongst citizens on the other.
2We borrow the definition of society from North, Wallis and Weingast [2009] (pag. 14): ”the
aggregate of individuals collectively dealing with a range of individual decisions in such a way to
produce common and shared beliefs about choices, consequences, and outcomes.”
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Our motivating example is post-Norman Conquest England (1066-1307). This pe-
riod marks the beginning of a transition from an almost purely manorial economy
to one increasingly relying on trade (Usher [1920], Pirenne [1925], Lopez [1971]).3 4
Several explanations for the rise of trade may be invoked, as for instance population
growth (North and Thomas [1973], Ryerson [1999]), regained access to Mediterranean
trade (Pirenne [1925]) and, in England, a feudal but stable society following the Nor-
man Conquest (Tait [1936], pag. 136). This transition goes hand in hand with the
appointment by the king of local officials in charge of both providing law and order and
collecting taxes (Ballard [1913], Green [1986]).5
Evidence available to us is strongly indicative of discretionary and disruptive be-
havior by these local officials (Ballard [1904], Bisson [2008]).6 7 Not surprisingly,
complaints are lodged by citizens and the king has little choice but to intervene (Bisson
[2008]). At least two major country-wide investigations are launched to verify allega-
tions of misbehavior (in 1169 and in 1274-1275), new officials are appointed whose main
function is to audit local officials, and explicit references to this problem are frequently
encountered in statutes and charters (including the Magna Charta).
3This period is sometimes referred to by Historians as the ”Revival of Trade” or the ”Commerce
Revolution” (see Lopez [1971]).
4By a manorial economy we intend a system in which the produce of each manor (say a piece of
land) is not traded. See Usher [1920] pag. 131. Also, see Maitland [1897] for the description of a
manorial economy as a type of rural economy.
5Scholars refer to the body of customs regulating trade among merchants during Medieval times
as the lex mercatoria. It has been debated whether this law requires some intervention by the local
seigneurial courts to be sustainable. Evidence strongly supports reliance on the local bureaucracy
(Kadens [2004], Sachs [2006]).
6Courts are easily turned into extortion machineries. This affects the efficiency of the judicial
system as, for instance, suitors are reluctant to attend them. See Stubbs [1905] pag 342-343 and pag.
450, and Ballard [1913] pag. lxii. Such misbehavior tends to be attributed to the practice of tax
farming whereby local officials are asked to make periodic fix payments to the king that reflect their
boroughs’ revenues: this gives the former strong incentives to over-extract coercively and pocket the
difference (Stubbs [1905], pag. 466-467). See Kiser [1994] for an informal discussion of the incentives
faced by a tax farmer when collecting surcharges from the tax base.
7The presence of centralized markets, needed for trade to occur, gives rise to opportunities for
extortions. In addition, merchandize must pass through checkpoints (ports, bridges, etc.) guarded by
the ruler’s men. Finally, commercial agreements, to be enforced, are notified to authorities.
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By the middle of the twelfth century a new pattern in the English institutional
landscape emerges: upon payment of an amount of money, the king increasingly relies
on townsmen directly to act as farmers for the revenues they generated.8 Through
obtaining Charters of Liberties towns are granted by the king the right to appoint
and fire officials in charge of local administration (including that of justice) and tax
collection. As we document, this phenomenon is large in scale: 53 out of circa 145
boroughs under direct royal control are endowed with these liberties by the end of
the period of interest, and these include almost all major towns. Charters institute
self-governance at the local level and are arguably among the first forms of political
institutions since the Dark Ages.9
Our interpretation of these events relies on efficiency considerations mostly: we make
the case that charters allowed for better market institutions because of the informa-
tional advantage towns enjoyed concerning the local officials’ actions.10 11 Consistently
with this rationale, data show a remarkable difference between royal and mesne towns,
i.e. towns that are under the immediate lordship of a local power-holder rather than
the king. Local lords, arguably better able to monitor their officials, appear to be sig-
8See Stubbs [1905], pag. 482. Payment for the grant of liberties may involve either an up-front
payment and/or an increment of the yearly sum to be paid back to the king. In 1131, London pays
one-hundred marks to obtain the right to appoint sheriffs in charge of judicial and fiscal matters. The
citizens of Lincoln are granted the right to ”hold their city in chief of the king” in exchange of two-
hundred marks of silver and four of golds (Stubbs [1905], pp. 164). Similarly, the city of Cambridge
pays ”three-hundred marks of silver, and one mark of gold, to have their town at ferm, and be exempt
from the intermeddling of the sheriff” (Stubbs [1905], pp. 165).
9Political power in towns is concentrated among the wealthiest citizens (see Maitland [1897], pag.
212). Arguably, this occurs because wealthy citizens contribute the most to the farm of the town. This
is of little concern to us as we are interested in investigating the delegation of authority from coercive
power-holders to wealth-creators, be them wealthy or not.
10The theory we put forward in this paper does not assume that towns are better able to control
officers for physical reasons – one could find arguments going either way – but simply that towns are
better informed about the behavior of officials than the king. This, in turn, and as we microfound in
the Technical Appendix, allows towns to engage in relational contracts with officials that exhibit more
favorable terms.
11Civic councils, acting as both the legislature and judicature, enforce the urban law through
special courts and by employing lower officials receiving a salary (Volckart and Mangels [1999] and the
references therein).
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nificantly less prone to delegating control of the bureaucracy to the citizenry.12 13 Two
towns – Liverpool in 1266 and Newcastle-under-Lyme toward the end of the thirteenth
century – lose the liberties previously granted them by the king when becoming under
a local lord’s control (Ballard and Tait [1923], pag. lvi).
In order to capture these events, we build a model in which a ruler chooses the
number of local officials to appoint, where officials possibly perform two tasks: (i)
supply law and order (market institutions) for a representative merchant to use and
produce wealth, and (ii) collect taxes.14 Law and order, by fostering trade, allows
for gains from specialization. Appointment rights may be delegated to the merchant.
The wealth created is here endogenous to the provision of market institutions and
the associated scope for expropriation: the larger the number of employed officials,
the higher the wealth potentially created and expropriated. Expropriation, physically
carried by the officials, may or may not be induced by the ruler. The interaction being
repeated, a self-sustainable Social Contract – an understanding between the ruler and
the merchant over taxation and the quality of market institutions – may be reached.
The degree of achieved economic efficiency depends on both the officials’ ability to
appropriate wealth and the merchant’s ability to escape taxation.15 In such a framework
we investigate how the allocation of the right to appoint officials affects the terms of
the social contract, and in particular the quality of market institutions.
Key to our analysis is the multitasking problem at the officials’ level, as well as
12Only 11 grants are documented among circa 120 mesne towns (see Section 5) In addition, one
could argue that ”delegating” control over a territory to a local lord is itself a form of self-governance.
While we do not necessarily disagree with this view, we are instead interested in the instances in which
the delegation of rights over taxation and administration concerns the creators of wealth directly.
13We employ the term bureaucracy even though we are aware of the fact that a routine-based
bureaucracy (intended in modern terms) may hardly have been in place in the course of the eleventh
and twelfth century. However, from the reign of Henry II onward, kings attempt to establish a formal
bureaucratic body (e.g. the Exchequer).
14For simplicity we model officials in a reduced form during most of the analysis. This is relaxed in
a Technical Appendix.
15See Buchanan [1975] for an analysis of the Social Contract in the absence of a third party enforcer.
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the different ability for the ruler and the citizenry to monitor misbehavior. The ruler
being only imperfectly able to monitor officials, a rent needs to be given up to prevent
arbitrary expropriation. When the efficient size of the bureaucracy needed to sustain
trade makes expropriation tempting, a rent-efficiency trade-off arises. The closer the
size of the bureaucracy to the efficient level, the higher the total rent that the ruler
must give up to avoid arbitrary and unobservable expropriation by officials.16
The merchant represents a natural way out from this trade-off: it may be profitable
to grant him appointment rights since he is naturally better informed about the exac-
tions he suffers, and thus able to pay a lower rent to the officials. The practice consisting
of setting towns at farm to their burgesses comes into existence: the merchant is in
charge of collecting the tax to be transferred to the ruler, and enforces the law. This
however implies a loss of control to the ruler over the bureaucracy and, therefore, a
higher temptation for the merchant to escape taxation.
Only when trade calls for a high demand for law enforcement does the rent-efficiency
trade-off arise and is delegation appealing to the ruler. If the officials’ sole task was to
collect the tax instead – i.e. the demand for law enforcement is low – enfranchisement
of (grant of political institutions to) the merchant would never take place.
Our analysis also points to the importance of considering a repeated interaction
between the ruler and the merchant: by allowing the creation of a peaceful system
of taxation, that is one different from coercive appropriation of wealth, the repeated
interaction creates room for officials’ expropriation in the first place and, by way of
consequence, political institutions.
16In the Technical Appendix, the ruler chooses the size of the bureaucracy in a town, as well as
the optimal relational contract between herself and the officials who both enforce the law and collect
taxes. Very much like tax farming, a relational contract consists of a self-sustaining (by the threat of
firing) stream of transfers to be made by the local bureaucracy to the ruler contingent on the realized
level of trade (say the number of merchants visiting the market). In this setting, any appropriation of
wealth by officials higher than the agreed upon level of taxation (between the ruler and the citizenry)
reduces potential trade in subsequent periods.
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To sum up, this paper sheds light on the relationship between trade, political in-
stitutions, and market institutions. An increase in the importance of trade goes hand
in hand with a stronger bureaucracy capable of enforcing law and order. A strong
bureaucracy is however potentially highly disruptive and preventing expropriation is
costly. Enfranchising the citizenry allows for a higher investment in market institutions
by lowering the cost of keeping a strong bureaucracy benevolent.
Concerning the course of events we seek to explain, it is undeniable that wars and
more generally the need to raise extra revenues also played an important role in several
occasions in fostering the grant of liberties by Medieval English rulers. In our view,
however, the fact that the delegation of appointment rights would be bargained over
constitutes further evidence of how much of an issue the misbehavior by local officials
was.
Also, the emergence and spread of self-governance among towns occurs in other parts
of Western Europe such as France and Northern Italy. In these areas, self-governing
towns are organized as communes that are characterized by an element of mutual
protection against forced expropriation by territorial overlords. It is documented that,
at least for several towns, (the threat of) civil unrest plays a major role in explaining
the arrival of this institutional structure (Thierry [1867]), thereby contradicting the
efficiency rationale put forward in this paper.17 Civil unrest also seems to play a role
in England. Two attempts at creating a commune are recorded—namely Gloucester
(1169-70) and York (1176)— but are crashed by the king, and Gloucester is punished
with the withdrawal of its liberties.18 In 1191, London also declares itself a commune
and elects a mayor, but sees its prerogatives being withdrawn a few years later.19 To
17The threat of rebellion may be encompassed in our model by means of appropriate strategies.
18York obtains the fee-farm (i.e. the perpetual lease of borough’s revenues) in 1190 (for six months)
and in 1212. See Tait [1936] pag. 176-179.
19On the London commune see Tait [1936]. Between 1239 and 1257 only, the liberties of London
are suspended on at least ten occasions, and granted again in exchange of a fine (Sheppard [1998] pag.
93). According to Tait [1936], by 1205 four towns have a mayor: London, Winchester, Exeter and
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the best of our knowledge, however, there exists no evidence of other episodes of civil
unrest that could account for the widespread granting of self-governance observed in
England. As Ballard puts it, whilst ”many of the French charters were extorted from
the lords by riot and revolution, our English charters are always the result of agreement
and often of purchase”.20
Perhaps the most compelling piece of evidence in favor of a voluntary grant of
liberties by the king is constituted by the amount of the farm itself: in 1156-57 Lincoln
pays 180 sterling for its farm, 40 more than the amount sheriffs accounted for in
previous years. In the same vein, townsmen of Andover in 1205 are willing to pay 95
sterling a year, an increase of 15 sterling compared to the farm previously accounted
for by the sheriff (Ballard [1913], pag. lxxvi-lxxvii). The same occurs at Gloucester
in 1165, where the town is granted at farm and pays an increment of 5 sterling over
the yearly farm fixed at 50 sterling (Maitland [1897], pag. 205). Townsmen’s higher
willingness to pay may well be explained by the lower cost of a more efficient town’s
administrative capacity.
Related Literature. Our paper puts emphasis on the rise of trade and the speci-
ficity of law enforcement as important determinants for the change in the institutional
landscape observed in post-Norman Conquest England through the end of the thir-
teenth century.
Much has been written on the dual role performed by States, and by coercive power-
holders in general, when enforcing the law (Lane [1958], Tilly [1985]).21 Also much
Lincoln.
20Ballard [1913], pag. cix. See also Reynolds [2004].
21The dual role played by power-holders when enforcing the law has been recently investigated by
Djankow et al. [2003], Besley and Robinson [2010], and Konrad and Skaperdas [2012]. See also Olson
[1993] and McGuire and Olson [1996]. Moselle and Polak [2001] build a model in which a predatory
State provides protection to peasants. Unlike in our setting, however, the provision of protection does
not require any investment in violence by the ruler.
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attention has been devoted to the functioning of political institutions as commitment
devices for power-holders (Machiavelli [1994], North and Weingast [1989], Horowitz
[1993], Greif, Milgrom and Weingast [1994], Barzel and Kiser [1997], Levi [1999], North
[1999], Greif [2005], Myerson [2008]). North and Thomas [1973] highlight the link
between the rise of trade and the arrival of more open forms of political institutions.
They make the case that as an economy increasingly relies on trade, the scope for
political institutions rises because the created wealth is easily appropriable.22 Bates
and Lien [1985] also highlight the role played by the nature of the available sources
of taxation, along with rulers’ need to wage wars, in shaping political institutions in
fourteenth century England and France.23 We depart from these theories in that we
place emphasis on the key role played by the bureaucracy needed to provide law and
order in shaping the institutional structure.
In this respect, our paper complements (and provides a formalization for) the the-
ory exposed by Gellner [1992]. The relationship between the control of the bureaucracy
and the enfranchisement of the citizenry links our paper to the literature on corruption
and decentralization of officials’ appointment as in Bardhan [2002] and Bardhan and
Mookherjee [2006]. The paper is also complementary to De Lara, Greif and Jha [2008],
Dess´ı and Piccolo [2009], and Egorov, Guriev and Sonin [2009]. De Lara, Greif and Jha
[2008] point out how administrative power is an important determinant of self-enforcing
representative systems. Our paper offers an explanation as to why the ruler may choose
to grant administrative power to citizens in the first place.24 Dess´ı and Piccolo [2009]
study medieval merchant guilds as a way to forego the rent accruing to privately in-
formed tax collectors. Differently from their framework, our focus is on the rent due to
22On the ability to appropriate wealth by rulers see also Mayshar, Moav and Neeman [2011].
23See also Slivinski and Sussman [2012].
24The authors define administrators as encompassing armies, tax farmers, feudal lords, bureaucra-
cies, and self-governed cities. We focus on a professional bureaucracy under the ruler’s control. We do
not include power feudal lords within this category.
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rulers’ imperfect ability to monitor tax collectors’ predatory behavior. Egorov, Guriev
and Sonin [2009] analyze the trade-off rulers face when allowing for free-media. By gen-
erating information, free-media lower the rent accruing to the bureaucracy providing
a public good. However, free-media also allow citizens to better coordinate and revolt
against the ruler. We depart from these theories in that we analyze the link between
trade and the specificity of the provision of law and order, which in turn allows us to
account for the historical events under consideration.
Sng and Moriguchi [2013] make the case that rulers of larger political units sustain
higher costs in monitoring officials in charge of tax collection: this leads to a less
efficient provision of public goods. Unlike in their setting, we focus on the dual function
performed by officials as a key ingredient in generating such an inefficiency, which may
in turn generate a change in the institutional structure.
A vast literature links the granting of political institutions to the need for rulers
to raise extra revenues (or increase public debt) so as to finance wars (Bates and Lien
[1985], North and Weingast [1989], Stasavage [2011], and Gennaioli and Voth [2012]).
While we certainly recognize the importance of this channel of influence, we provide a
complementary explanation — one relying solely on economic forces — to account for
the rise of political institutions.
Our analysis of market supporting institutions is related to Acemoglu [2005] and
Besley and Persson [2009]. In Acemoglu [2005] a consensually strong State may emerge,
in which politically weak rulers impose high taxes and generate wealth. We point at
the bureaucracy as a main determinant of such an outcome. Besley and Persson [2009]
study the determinants of the State’s investment in legal and fiscal capacity and show
a complementarity between them. We contribute to this line of research by studying
how commitment problems affect the design of market and political institutions.
Our paper is also related to the literature on enfranchisement as in Acemoglu and
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Robinson [2000, 2001], and Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni [2010]. In these papers,
an elite is in power and, typically, must design institutions so as to either prevent the
military or other subgroups of the citizenry from taking over. Lizzeri and Persico [2004]
show how the expansion of the franchise can take place even in the absence of the threat
of a take-over. Though our paper is close in the spirit to Lizzeri and Persico [2004], we
complement these works by investigating the conditions under which the providers of
law enforcement (rulers) decide to let go some of their prerogatives in the first place.
Finally, the repeated interaction between a Principal – the ruler or the citizenry –
and the bureaucracy (presented in the Technical Appendix) borrows from the grow-
ing literature on relational incentive contracts as in Levin [2003] and Malcomson [2013].
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces the model setting. Section 3
studies the institutional structure in a finitely repeated game. Section 4 solves the in-
finitely repeated version of the model. Section 5 offers a historical account dedicated to
the institutional evolution in post-Norman Conquest England, along with a descriptive
analysis of the number and type of liberties granted by rulers. Section 6 concludes. All
the proofs are relegated to the Appendix 1. The Technical Appendix in attachment
to this paper presents a formal treatment of the repeated relation between a principal
(ruler or citizens) and the bureaucracy.25
2 The Model Setting
We consider the interaction between a ruler R, officials A, and a representative
merchant M . For simplicity, we present this model as if it were a game between R and
25The Technical Appendix is available online at the following link:
https://sites.google.com/site/simonemeragliawebpage/research.
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M only, treating A in a reduced form instead.26 The Technical Appendix solves for the
version of the game in which A is a fully-fledged player. The reduced form approach
taken here captures the essential economic effect of political institutions.
We now present the players’ action spaces and payoffs. Let the Social Contract SC
be defined as the pair {t, q}, where:
• t ∈ R+ represents the (lump sum) tax paid by M to R,
• q ∈ R+ represents the size of the bureaucracy, e.g. number of officials.
Ruler : R’s action space is ΩR = {I, qI , tI , TRI }. Subscript I denotes the identity of
the player choosing the terms of SC = {tI , qI}; terms that can always be rejected by
the other player. R chooses I ∈ {R,M}, and if I = M we say that political institutions
have been granted.
The investment q determines two functions. First, it is an input in the produc-
tion function y(q) owned by M . The higher the number of officials, the greater their
ability to enforce contracts and protect trade routes, and thus the higher the potential
output. Formally, we take y(q) to be twice continuously differentiable, non-decreasing
and concave.27 28 Second, it determines A’s ability to coercively appropriate output
y(q) through the extraction function f(q). Formally, f(q) is twice continuously dif-
ferentiable, increasing and concave, with f(0) = 0. Coercive extraction has a natural
26This also allows us to analyze a deterministic economy. Uncertainty over the produced output is
considered in the Technical Appendix.
27The created wealth y(q) depends in general on M ’s discount factor: more patient merchants are
more able to sustain exchanges even absent a formal system of legal enforcement. To put it differently,
a strong system of contract enforcement is needed when merchants are sufficiently short sighted and/or
when trade networks expands (see Greif [1993] and Dixit [2003]). We abstract from this effect to ease
exposition since our results remain unaffected.
28It is possible to build a simple economy in which multiple producers/merchants engage in pro-
duction and trade. Producers create wealth by exchanging their endowments. The wealth created
positively depends on the amount of endowment exchanged (e.g. gains from specialization), which in
turn is directly related to both the effectiveness of the legal system and the patience of agents. A
formal modeling is available from the authors upon request.
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upperbound in the amount of wealth produced y(q). When I = R, R chooses q.
TRI (q) ∈ [0,min{f(q), y(q)}] denotes the wealth R can coercively extract for a given
regime of political institutions I, wealth produced y(q), and ability to expropriate f(q).
In words, TRI (q) ∈ [0,min{f(q), y(q)}] represents what the ruler can appropriate when
ordering officials to engage in expropriation, where TRM = 0: when delegating the choice
of the Social Contract to M , R loses her ability to coercively extract from M .29 30 31
To sum up, we have that:
{qI , tI , TRI } =
 {qR, tR, T
R
R } if I = R,
{∅} if I = M.
R’s payoff is given by:
VI(t, q) = T˜I(t, q)− C(t, q), (1)
C(t, q) is the cost of investing in A given its size q, which we explain below and mi-
crofound in the Technical Appendix. Further, T˜I(t, q) ∈ [0,min{f(q), y(q)}] represents
the wealth extracted by R in equilibrium and for a given regime of political institutions
I and terms of SC. In particular, we have that:
T˜I(t, q) =
 t if SC played,TRI (q) otherwise, (2)
that is T˜I(t, q) can either be equal to the tax t, or to coercive appropriation (if I = R).
29We disregard R’s option to reject the contracted proposed by M when I = M . This is with no
loss of generality given TRM = 0.
30In the following we skip arguments for the amount T of wealth extracted unless necessary.
31In a previous version of this paper we consider the case in which R retains some degree of control
over A even though I = M . Main results remain unaffected.
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Consider now the cost to R of investing in A. Formally, we have that:
C(t, q) =

cq if T˜ ≥ f(q),
cq(T˜ ) + c[q − q(T˜ )] if T˜ < f(q),
0 if I = M,
(3)
where c > c > 0 and where the quantity q(T˜ ) is explained below. According to (3),
when I = R, a higher cost of hiring officials arises only if the taxation R requires A
to extract from M is lower than the sum A could potentially extract by employing
coercion.32 The idea here is that, when the number of appointed officials is sufficiently
high so as to enable potential coercive over-taxation of M by A (that is, when T˜ = t <
f(q)), R’s inability to observe A’s behavior generates a rent (4C = c− c) necessary to
prevent arbitrary expropriation. When instead R induces expropriation by her officials
(i.e. T˜ = f(q)), a rent no longer needs to be given up since incentives are then aligned.
Finally, when I = M , R no longer incurs the cost of investing in A.
The specific functional form considered is justified in the Technical Appendix. Define
q(T˜ ) as the value of q such that T˜ = f(q). If the amount extracted T˜ in (2) is given
by f(q), we then have an identity f(q) = f(q), which implies that q = q, ∀q ∈ R+. In
this case the cost function is given by C(q) = cq.
Consider now the case in which T˜ = t in (2), for some fixed t. Given the definition
for q(t), and given that f(q) is increasing in q, we have that q < q(t) implies t > f(q),
and viceversa. Then, from (4), the cost c is incurred only if q > q(t), i.e. if and only
if t < f(q). We then have that:
C(t, q) = c{min[q(t), q]}+ c{max[q − q(t), 0]}. (4)
32The Technical Appendix shows that a higher cost can also arise when R tries to induce her
bureaucracy to prey on M . We postpone this issue to the analysis of the repeated interaction between
R and M .
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The cost function as defined in (4) has a kink at q(t). For a given t, the marginal cost
of investing in A switches from c to c > c at q = q(t).33
The cost function is assumed independent of A’s discount factor (βA ∈ [0, 1)) and
uM . This is made to ease exposition only. The Technical Appendix derives the cost
function for the investment in the local bureaucracy.34 It is there formally proven that
C(t, q) ≥ cq for any choice of q, with the strict inequality holding when t < f(q), i.e.
for q > q(t).35 All else equal, the more short-sighted A and/or the higher reservation
utility for M , the higher c.
Finally, we set R’s reservation utility to zero.
Merchant : M ’s action space is given by ΩM = {Y (q), qI , tI , aMI }, where aMI ∈
{0, 1} is relevant only when I = R and represents M ’s choice as to accept (aMR = 1)
or reject (aMR = 0) the transfer t proposed by R. Further Y (q) ∈ {0, y(q)} denotes
M ’s participation decision: Y = 0 means no participation in the formal economy, and
conversely. The other choices have already been described above.
Political institutions amount to enfranchising M by granting him the right to choose
q. Formally, political institutions are a way by which R endows M with a technology
to replace – and, therefore, appoint – A. Political institutions can be thought of as
the institution of check and balances over the actual use of force by law enforcers, say
popular assemblies and, in medieval times, (merchant) guilds also. Formally, the grant
of political institutions causes both a downward shift in the cost of hiring A and a
33In the course of the analysis, we make sure of q being well defined when we take into account
that t is a function of q.
34Although in the Technical Appendix we derive the cost function for discrete choices of the size of
the bureaucracy, a generalization to a continuum choice is immediate. See the discussion therein.
35See Proposition 1 in the Technical Appendix. Clearly, the cost of investing in each officer cannot
exceed the sum the officer extracts from the merchants, be it equal to coercive extraction or taxation.
If it is so, the cost of investing in the bureaucracy is trivially given by the total sum extracted. Without
loss of generality we anticipate this is never a concern, since R always chooses an investment level that
allows her to retain some positive profits. Finally, neither is this a concern when M is empowered with
decision rights.
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transfer of decision rights over the investment in the bureaucracy (q) from R to M .36
M ’s payoff is given by:
UI(t, q) =
 y(q)− T˜R(t, q) if I = R,y(q)− T˜M(t, q)− cq if I = M, (5)
where T˜I(t, q) is given by (2). When I = M , the cost investing in A to M is given by cq.
Unlike R, M perfectly observes the wealth he is extracted by the appointed officials.
This difference in the monitoring/auditing technology implies that M does not pay a
rent to A despite its ability to engage in coercive expropriation.37
M ’s reservation utility is denoted by uM ≥ 0. This may be interpreted as either
M ’s payoff in the informal economy where output is unobservable to R. Another
possible interpretation – of clear historical relevance – is that the higher uM , the more
tangible the risk of rebellion.
In the rest of the analysis all subscripts are dropped unless needed.
Timing : The game is infinitely repeated in discrete time τ = 0, 1, .... Let
βM , βR ∈ [0, 1) represent the players’ discount factors. The equilibrium concept is
subgame perfection. In every period τ the timing of the stage game is the following:
1. R chooses Iτ ∈ {R,M};
36In this paper political institutions are binary: either they are granted or not and, if granted,
they amount to M deciding the investment in the size of the bureaucracy. One may think of a
smoother model in which political institutions consist in R deciding how much M can invest in its
own bureaucracy, while keeping her own bureaucracy in place. In this case, it may be shown that our
main results remain unaffected. See the footnote to the comments following Proposition 2.
37Formally, the different ability to monitor officials, makes the merchant able to write a relational
incentive contract that results in a lower cost of investing in market institutions when coercion by
officials is prevented: the merchant makes a better use of the threat of firing officials when behaving
in an extortionary manner. For details, see the Technical Appendix.
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2. if Iτ = M (Iτ = R), M (R) chooses the investment in the bureaucracy qτ ;
3. M decides whether to participate (Yτ ). If M participates, the output y(qτ ) is
produced. Otherwise Yτ = 0, M gets uM , R gets zero, and the period ends;
4. if Yτ (q) = y(qτ ), M (R) proposes transfer tτ to R (M). R (M) accepts a
R
τ = 1
(aMτ = 1) or refuses a
R
τ = 0 (a
M
τ = 0). If a rejection occurs (by any player), R
extracts TRI,τ .
5. Payoffs materialize.
We wish to emphasize that we assume that the choice of political institutions is not
irreversible, i.e. it is made in every period τ . In particular changing political regime is
taken to be costless.
Also, throughout our analysis, we seek the equilibrium guaranteeing the highest
payoff to whoever is choosing the terms of the social contract. Any different allocation
of the bargaining power between the ruler and the merchant does not affect the
rationale for the choice of the institutional setting.
Manorial versus Trade economy. In the following sections we divide the analysis
by distinguishing between two cases: (i) a manorial economy, i.e. one in which the
production of wealth is independent of law enforcement, i.e. y(q) = y = y(0) > uM , and
(ii) a trade economy, i.e. one in which wealth production depends on the investment
in law enforcement. In case (i) trade plays no role: for instance, the produce of the
land is shared between peasants and the lord of the manor who collects part of the
produce as taxes via her own bureaucracy (if institutions are not granted).38 In case
38We slightly abuse definition when referring to a manorial economy as one in which trade does
not occur. By this terminology we wish to capture an economy concentrated on the hierarchical
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(ii), the rise of trade opportunities makes production of wealth more responsive to the
provision of law and order.39 In this latter case officials perform two functions, namely
law enforcement to sustain trade, and tax collection.
Before proceeding, we introduce a technical assumption that ensures a well-behaved
problem:
Technical Assumptions: In a trade economy we have:
A1: |∂2y(q)
∂q2
| > |∂2f(q)
∂q2
|.
A1 implies that M ’s payoff is either decreasing or inversely U-shaped whenever
T˜ (q) = f(q). The technical implications of A1 are relegated to Appendix 1.
Also, define q∗(c) as the level of q that maximizes surplus S(q, c) = [y(q) − cq]
created in the trade economy. We make the following assumption:
A2: In a trade economy, we have y(q∗(c))− f(q∗(c)) < uM and df(q
∗)
dq
> c.
In a trade economy, coercive extraction induces M to opt out from the formal econ-
omy if the efficient level of market institutions were to be chosen. It is straightforward
relationship between the lord (owner of the manor) and the peasants working the land. The lord
collects taxes (perhaps in kind) from the peasantry and consumes the produce of the land without
being connected to wide trade networks.
39Determinants (different from the provision of law enforcement) of a shift in gains from trade
(specialization) may be several, as for instance population growth and occupation of previously uncul-
tivated lands (see North and Thomas [1973]).
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to show that q∗ = 0 in a manorial economy: this further implies that in a manorial
economy the claim in A2 does not hold.
Assumptions A1-A2 simply allow us to focus our interest on the two most relevant
cases. None of these assumptions affects our results.40
We proceed by first presenting the results in the one-period (or finitely repeated)
game between R and M .
3 The Ruler-Merchant One-Period Game
SupposeR andM interact one time only. We solve the one-period game by backward
induction. We denote by SCs ≡ {ts, qs} and Is the equilibrium social contract and
choice of political institutions, respectively. Consider the case in which I = R. Given
the level q chosen by R in stage 2, we necessarily have t = f(q), for R would not find it
profitable to request t < f(q) and M would reject any proposal t > f(q). Consequently
in the one-period game, absent political institutions (I = R), in the case of a trade
economy we have:
T˜ (q) = min[f(q), y(q)], (6)
where (6) and (3) imply that C(q) = cq. Since A cannot extract more than what R
demands, no rent ∆C is incurred. R solves the following problem:
max
{q}
[f(q)− cq]
s.t. y(q)− f(q) ≥ uM , (7)
40A formal proof for all the cases that could possible arise is available from the authors upon request.
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where (7) ensures M ’s participation in the formal economy (PC).
In the case of a manorial economy the derivation of R’s program is obvious.
We can now state our first result:
Proposition 1 In the one-period game, taxation is equal to potential extraction and
political institutions are not granted independently of whether trade occurs.
In a manorial economy, the ruler over-invests in market institutions. Given
A1-A2, in a trade economy an under-investment with respect to the efficient level of
law enforcement instead occurs.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
Intuition. Leaving aside the coordination issue between the officials and the ruler
for a moment, we have that, on the one hand, a manorial economy induces an ineffi-
cient over-investment in the size of the bureaucracy. This comes as a response to the
merchant’s inability to commit to transfer the ruler a sum greater than what can be
coercively extracted were an efficient (namely zero) level of market institutions to be
chosen.
In a trade economy, the officials’ ability to expropriate the merchants leads to an
inefficient under-investment in bureaucracy so as to ensure participation in the formal
economy by the merchants. The ruler’s (and the officials’) lack of commitment is now
preventing any movements towards efficiency. Whichever the relevant distortion, it
moves the economy afar from efficiency.41
41Acemoglu, Golosov, and Tsyvinski [2008] study a neoclassical growth model in presence of self-
interested politicians able to extract rents. Limiting such behavior causes inefficient labor and capital
investment choices. Despite taxation being lump sum, distortions arise. This phenomenon occurs in
our model also. Finally, the distinction between a manorial and trade economy is reminiscent of the
one between weak and strong States in Acemoglu [2005].
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History offers us a stark example of the problem faced by rulers wishing to enlarge
their bureaucracy providing law and order. In twelfth-century England, Henry II and
his sons experiment a new regime of justice:
Henry had much to change this by 1178, when a cleric close to the royal
court named Roger of Howden summed up his latest exercise of power as
follows: ”Staying in England, the lord-king questioned the justices he had
appointed in England whether they had treated the people of the realm
with decent restraint.” And when he learned that the people were ”overly
oppressed” by an excessive ”multitude” of justices, the king took ”counsel
with competent men” and decided to reduce the number of justices from
height to five, ”namely, two clerics and three laymen, all chosen from his
private entourage [familia]” [...].42
The value of this citation is twofold. First, it makes clear that justice and extraction
were closely intertwined. Second, it suggests that justices’ exactions were conceivably
arbitrary rather than voluntarily induced by Henry II. At this point of the analysis,
this is of little concern to us: all we are interested in is the link between surplus
extraction from the citizenry and investment in law and order. Regardless of officers’
behavior being arbitrary or not, an overwhelming ability to extract calls for a reduced
investment in law enforcement.
Political institutions are never granted in this one-period setting in which taxation
is equal to coercive extraction. This result is intuitive: first, since commitment
problems call for coercive extraction at equilibrium, there is no temptation for officers
to extract a higher sum. Monitoring of (and/or rent to) the officers is not needed.
Second, since taxation is equal to coercive extraction, R does not find it profitable to
(possibly) curb her own power to exert coercion over the merchants by granting them
42Bisson [2008], pp. 378-380.
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institutions. Since coercion is employed, any handover of power by R would result in
a lower amount of taxes collected.
In the next section, we analyze the infinitely repeated version of this game. Trigger
strategies may be employed by R and M in order to sustain SC where taxation differs
from coercive extraction, thereby possibly enabling a more efficient investment.
4 Infinitely Repeated Game
The infinitely repeated setting is different from the one-period one in that both
peaceful taxation and expropriation are feasible, where expropriation is here defined
as the extraction by A from M of a sum greater than the one promised in the social
contract. When expropriation is an issue, keeping in check A’s behavior is costly to
R. As formally proven in the Technical Appendix, when gains from specialization are
sufficiently high, an efficient level of market institutions q∗(c) implies higher rents for
the officials. Also, the rent accruing to each single official grows with the size of A
(see Proposition 2 in the Technical Appendix). In the following, in accordance with
(3), we do not formally pursue the increase in the cost of investing in each single
official brought about by an increment in the size of the bureaucracy. However, this
interpretation remains relevant and is discussed below the stated proposition.
In the infinitely repeated setting we first define the history of a game:
hτ = (Iτ , qτ , Y τ , tτ , aτR, a
τ
M , (T
R)τ )
as the collection of sequences of past actions taken by players from period 0 until τ −1.
A subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) is given by R’s choice of I˜τ given history
hτ , q˜τ given {hτ , Iτ}, M ’s output production Y˜τ given {hτ , Iτ , qτ}, a proposal t˜τ given
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{hτ , Iτ , qτ , Yτ}, a choice a˜I,τ given {hτ , Iτ , qτ , Yτ , tτ}, and finally R’s extraction choice
TRI,τ as a function of the history {hτ , Iτ , qτ , Yτ , tτ , aR,τ , aM,τ}. We focus on the SPE that
maximizes R (M)’s payoff when I = R (I = M).
R and M play stationary trigger strategies in which each player threatens to revert
to the one-period stage game ever after a deviation from the equilibrium S˜C ≡ {t˜, q˜}
is detected at any stage in period τ or in any previous period τ ′ = 0, ..., τ − 1. More
specifically, if the cooperation phase involves the grant of political institutions in addi-
tion to a pair {t˜, q˜}, the punishment phase implies that R costlessly and forever takes
political institutions back should a deviation by any player occur.
Players’ deviation from S˜C may depend on the grant of political institutions. Absent
political institutions, R can deviate at different stages in any single period τ : (i) at the
investment stage, and (ii) at the transfer/expropriation stage. M can also deviate at two
stages: (i) at the output production stage and (ii) at the transfer stage (accept/reject
a proposal). The temptation to deviate at the transfer stage may occur because of the
difference between t˜ and f(q˜). If the former is greater than the latter, the temptation
to deviate rests on M , and viceversa. In presence of political institutions, R cannot
deviate at any stage.43 If political institutions are granted instead, R cannot deviate at
any stage, whilst M can be tempted to deviate either at the investment stage and/or
at the transfer one.
Given I˜ ∈ {R,M} and S˜C ≡ {t˜, q˜}, we now state the players’ Incentive Compati-
bility Constraints (ICC(j)) for j = {R,M}. We derive these constraints for the case
of a trade economy: the case of a manorial economy is a straightforward variation of
the former one.
Consider the case in which I˜ = R. First we analyze M ’s incentive to deviate from
S˜C. In any period τ , ICC(M) at the transfer stage is given by:
43Allowing for a deviation by R in period τ when Iτ = M does not affect our results in any major
way.
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y(q˜)− t˜
1− βM ≥ [y(q˜)− T
R
R (q˜)] +
βM
1− βM U
s,
where U s is M ’s utility in the one-period stage game as defined in Proposition 1. By
deviating at the transfer stage, M abides to coercive extraction TRR (q˜) = f(q˜) so as to
forgo t˜.44 ICC(M) is rewritten as:
βM ≥ t˜− f(q˜)
[y(q˜)− f(q˜)]− U s . (8)
M ’s temptation to deviate is relevant whenever t˜ > f(q˜). Intuitively, since M
produces an output Yτ (q˜) ∈ {0, y(q˜)} according to the level of T˜R(q˜) he expects to pay,
a possible deviation at the transfer stage rules out a deviation at the production one,
i.e. M optimally chooses to participate in the formal economy.
Let us now analyze R’s incentive to deviate from S˜C, given I˜ = R. The difference
between t˜ and TRR (q˜) affects the profitability of deviating at both the investment and
the transfer stage. Intuitively, if t˜ > TRR (q˜), no deviation is profitable in stage 4.
If a deviation occurs in stage 2, given the trigger strategy played by M , R replicates
the investment in the one-period game. Therefore, by slightly abusing definitions, we
name the condition for no-deviations by R in stage 2 as her Participation Constraint
PC(R):
t˜− cq˜
1− βR ≥ [f(q
s)− cqs] + βR[f(q
s)− cqs]
1− βR ,
where PC(R) is independent of βR, and where the cost of hiring officers is equal to c.
45
PC(R) can be rewritten as:
44Formally, we have TRR (q˜) = min[y(q˜), f(q˜)]. However, for M to find it tempting to deviate, it
must be that min[y(q˜), f(q˜)] = f(q˜).
45We here anticipate the result in Lemma 1 (see below). A deviation in stage 2 may occur if t˜ > f(q˜)
only, which further explains why the cost of hiring a single officer is equal to c independently of Iτ .
24
t˜− cq˜ ≥ f(qs)− cqs. (9)
Consider now a deviation in stage 4, given I˜ = R. Such a deviation is relevant when
t˜ ≤ f(q˜). Therefore, ICC(R) is given by:
t˜− C(q˜)
1− βR ≥ {min[y(q˜), f(q˜)]− cq˜}+
βR
1− βR [f(q
s)− cqs]. (10)
From (4), the first term on the right-hand-side (hereafter RHS) in (10) suggests
that, when inducing coercive extraction over M , the cost to R of hiring A is given
by c.46 After a deviation has occurred, R and M revert to the one-period game ever
after, where taxation is equal to coercive extraction. ICC(R) in (10) can be rewritten
as:
βR ≥ {min[y(q˜), f(q˜)]− cq˜} − [t˜− C(q˜)]{min[y(q˜), f(q˜)]− cq˜} − [f(qs)− cqs] . (11)
We show that either PC(R) implies ICC(R), or the reverse holds:
Lemma 1 Provided I˜ = R, when t˜ > f(q˜), R’s temptation to deviate occurs at the
investment stage only. When t˜ ≤ f(q˜) instead, R’s temptation to deviate occurs at the
extraction stage only.
Proof. See the Appendix.
46The Technical Appendix provides a formal argument for the cost of inducing predation from A on
M . Formally, the cost of inducing predation may be higher than c, and it shrinks as A becomes more
short-sighted. Propositions 1 and 2 in the Technical Appendix prove that a sufficiently short-sighted
and large bureaucracy make the cost to R of inducing expropriation lower than the cost of preventing
it. We expect these conditions to be met when the economy relies on trade.
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When I˜τ = M , ICC(M) is appropriately redefined according to (3) so as to account
for the fact that M now incurs the cost of investing in law and order. We have:
y(q˜)− t˜− cq˜
1− βM ≥ [y(q˜)− cq˜] +
βM
1− βM U
s,
which is rewritten as:
βM ≥ t˜
[y(q˜)− cq˜]− U s . (12)
We anticipate that, since TRM = 0, a deviation by M at the investment stage is not
relevant.
In order to solve for the equilibrium of the game, we proceed by first characterizing
SCR that guarantees the highest payoff to R absent political institutions. We then
analyze the scope for political institutions along with their impact on the sustainable
Social Contract.
4.1 No Political Institutions
We here consider SCR = {tR, qR} as the sustainable social contract that maximizes
R’s payoff absent political institutions, i.e. Iτ = R, ∀τ . Given that, equilibrium
strategies are as described above.
R solves the following problem in each period τ :
max
{t,q}
[t− cq]
s.t. BC, PC, ICC(M), PC(R), ICC(R).
First note that BC (Budget Constraint) amounts to the objective function being
greater or equal than zero, and it is implied by PC(R). We proceed by dividing the
analysis in different cases, depending on the type of economy we consider.
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4.1.1 Manorial Economy
In a pure manorial economy the main concern is M ’s temptation to renege on SCR at
the transfer stage. Movements toward the efficient size of the bureaucracy, i.e. q∗ = 0,
go hand in hand with an increased temptation to deviate for M .
In solving R’s problem, we anticipate that only ICC(M) binds and control ex-post
that all the disregarded constraints hold. In each period τ R solves:
max
{q}
βM{[y − f(q)]−max[y − f(qs);uM ]}+ f(q)− cq.
where the cost of hiring officers is equal to c since tR ≤ f(qR). The First Order Condition
(hereafter FOC) of this problem is given by:
(1− βM)∂f(q)
∂q
= c. (13)
The following Lemma holds:
Lemma 2 The solution lies within the efficient and the ”one-period level” of investment
and is independent of R’s short-sightedness. The less short-sighted M , the closer the
economy to efficiency.
Proof. See the Appendix.
A short-sighted merchant impairs movements toward efficiency when law enforce-
ment is not needed. The economy can end up in, or close to, an equilibrium of the
finitely repeated game in which coercive extraction is employed by the ruler, with
the associated distortion imposed on the economy represented by the cost of the
bureaucracy. The ruler tends to over-invest in officials so as to appropriate more of the
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surplus produced by the merchants.
We now turn to the analysis of the trade economy.
4.1.2 Trade Economy
In a trade economy law enforcement is an input to output production by M . Given
A2, M ’s deviation is no longer a concern when solving R’s problem. At the efficient
level of market institutions R may be tempted to renege on SCR. Formally, in each
period τ R solves:
max
{q}
[y(q)− uM − C(t, q)]
s.t. ICC(R),
where we have substituted for PC in the objective function.
The following Lemma holds:
Lemma 3 The solution lies within the one-period and the (constrained) efficient level
of investment q◦(c, c) < q∗(c), and it is independent of M ’s shortsightedness. All else
equal, the less short-sighted R, the closer the economy to (constrained) efficiency.
Sufficiently high rents to the officials cause the one-period solution to occur
independently of R’s shortsightedness.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In a trade economy approaching an efficient number of officials goes hand in hand
with a higher temptation to renege by the ruler. The reason for this temptation is
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twofold. First, the ruler’s proceeds from coercive expropriation are higher than the one
from taxation. Second, by inducing expropriation, the ruler saves on the (extra-)rent
accruing to officials necessary to prevent arbitrary expropriation. If the optimal (to
the ruler) level of investment is not sustainable, both sources of temptation force the
ruler to distort her investment downward. High levels of short-sightedness and/or high
investment costs may even drive the ruler back to the one-period allocation in which
she employs coercion to appropriate surplus. This outcome may be interpreted as one
involving either a coercion-extraction cycle (Finer [1997]) or the permanent threat of
rebellions. In the former case, rulers develop a bureaucracy and finance it by letting
officers prey on the merchants. In the latter case, the merchant is allowed to retain its
reservation utility only. In both cases the strength of the ruler induces low levels of
production.
The rent for officials stems from the fact that they both provide law enforcement
and collect taxes (that is, from the fact that they multi-task). This high rent is
responsible for the (constrained) optimal investment to fall short of the efficient one.
Importantly, such an inefficiency would appear even if the ruler could fully commit to
a (peaceful) taxation policy.
As a comparative statics exercise, we explore the role played by M ’s reservation
utility uM on R’s temptation to renege. Intuitively, ceteris paribus, a high investment
in the bureaucracy implies that R is increasingly tempted to deviate from SCR as
the wealth retained by M goes up. This intuition is further strengthened by the fact
that uM tends to increase the officials’ temptation to expropriate, and hence their rent
also (see Proposition 1 in the Technical Appendix).47 It is straightforward to show
that, were uM to be equal to zero, R would be able to select the efficient size of the
47For a formalization of c see section B.2 and Proposition 1 in the Technical Appendix to this paper.
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bureaucracy (q∗(c)) and extract the whole surplus created in the economy.
When SCR fails to move the economy close enough to efficiency, R might consider
political institutions as a valuable option.
4.2 Political Institutions
Political institutions consist of R delegating to M the monitoring and firing of
officials A, along with the choice of the investment q. Political institutions affect our
analysis in two ways: first, they lower the rent accruing to A (i.e. the cost of market
institutions) in a trade economy. In this case, delegation of appointment rights to
M generates a rent-saving effect measured by ∆C. Second, political institutions
determine a shift of bargaining power from R to M : M chooses the terms of SCM . By
doing so, M bears the cost of investing in market institutions and sets his own taxation
so as to leave R indifferent between granting political institutions or not.
We can now state the following result:
Proposition 2 Given A2, all else equal, political institutions are granted if and only
if:
(i) there is scope for trade, and
(ii) the merchant is sufficiently patient.
All else equal, political institutions are more likely to occur when the ruler is short-
sighted.
When complemented by political institutions, market institutions are at the efficient
level q∗(c).
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Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuition. Political institutions are valuable in that they (i) lower the cost of
investing in market institutions and (ii) deter (i.e. increase the cost of) potential
collusion (communication) between the ruler and the officials. If we were to abstract
from (ii), political institutions allow for a more efficient level of market institutions.
Control over the bureaucracy is key here.
Political institutions are not granted in a manorial economy since the only function
performed by the officials is that of collecting taxes from the merchant. This feature
makes control over the officials possible for the ruler through the size of the investment
q only. Furthermore, in a manorial economy any movement toward the efficient level of
investment in the bureaucracy increases the merchant’s temptation to escape taxation.
Hence, the ruler cannot gain by granting the right to appoint tax collectors to the
merchant who simply cannot commit to any transfer that compensates her.
In a trade economy instead, the ruler may contemplate granting political institutions
so as to curb both officials’ and her own potential arbitrary behavior, which in turn
originates from the fact that officials now performs two tasks. Trade makes a positive
level of market institutions desirable. Such a high investment in q however makes
expropriation feasible. When a larger bureaucracy is needed to accommodate increasing
volumes of trade, the cost of the bureaucracy also increases: each single official fails
to internalize the externality imposed by his predatory behavior on other officials (see
the Technical Appendix). Keeping officials in check gets more costly to the ruler as
officials appropriates a rent. This, in turn, exacerbates the ruler’s temptation to induce
a coercive behavior in the first place, which further distorts efficiency by requiring lower
and lower levels of market institutions.
Delegation of appointment (and firing) rights to the merchant restores efficiency in
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the level of market institutions by lowering their cost.48
Finally, all else equal a more short-sighted ruler, say a ruler exerting a war effort,
makes the delegation of control rights over the provision of law and order to the
merchant more likely. Absent political institutions, her impatience further distorts
the investment in the bureaucracy needed to sustain trade. Hence, an impatient ruler
is willing to accept a lower lump-sum amount from the merchant in exchange of the
grant of liberties.
In light of the offered rationale for political institutions, a final comment is
dedicated to the role played by M ’s reservation utility. Recall that, absent political
institutions, an efficient provision of market institutions at a cost c is ensured when
M ’s reservation utility is null. In this case, political institutions do not play any role
and, consequently, do not emerge. All else equal, higher levels of M ’s reservation
utility increase both R and A’s temptation to coercively extract. The higher M ’s
reservation utility, the more likely political institutions are to be granted.
In the following section we present historical evidence in support of the results
highlighted in our formal model.
5 Trade, Administration and Freedom Charters
We argue that the dynamics of trade and political institutions in England (and
part of Wales) between the eleventh and the thirteenth century make a case for our
model. Table 1 below presents a chronology of the main events occurring in England
48The main result in Proposition 2, namely that political institutions are granted if and only if trade
is relevant, would also hold in a richer setting in which political institutions amount to R choosing the
size of both (i) the bureaucracy under M ’s control and (ii) the bureaucracy under her direct control.
A formal proof is available from the authors upon request.
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during the period of interest (1066-1307).
Table 1: Major Events. England and Wales 1066-1307.
Year Fact
1066 Norman Conquest / William the Conqueror
1087 William II
1100 Henry I (Coronation Charter)
1130-31 Charters of Lincoln and London
1135 Stephen of Blois
1139 - 1154 Civil war
1154 Henry II
1169-70 Inquest of the Sheriffs
1189 Richard I / Third Crusade
1192 - 94 End of the Crusade - Return of Richard to England
1194 The Iter of 1194 - Election of the coroner
1199 John
1202 War with France breaks out
1215 - 17 Magna Charta - First Barons’ War
1216 Henry III (minor)
1227 Henry III
1258-59 Provisions of Oxford - Westminster
1263 - 1267 Second Barons’ War
1266 - 67 Dictum of Kenilworth - Statute of Marlborough
1272 Edward I
1274 - 1275 Inquiry
1275 First Parliament / Statute of Westminster I
1277 First Welsh War
1282 - 83 Second Welsh War
1285 Statute of Westminster II (chapter 13)
1296 First War of Scottish Independence breaks out
1307 Death of Edward I
Revival of Trade. Tenth century Europe is feudal. Society is essentially divided
between those who fight (kings and landlords), pray (churchmen), and work the land
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(peasants).49 Much of the economy is rural and trade is local. However, by the turn
of the eleventh century, an impressive revival of trade, which had been at its minimal
level since the collapse of the Roman Empire, takes place, particularly along the trade
routes linking Northern Italy to the flourishing ports situated in the Low Countries
(e.g. Bruges). By the end of the tenth century trade also spreads to England, and
especially to London (Ballard [1904], pag. 116). The Norman Conquest (1066) fosters
trade (Tait [1936], pag. 136), and the great inquest into royal domains launched in
1086 and leading to the compilation of the Domesday Book, shows a transition from a
barter-economy to a money one (Ballard [1904], pag. 77).
Traded commodities, to name only a few, include wool (England), clothes (Flanders)
and wine (Gascony).50 From this stems a new social class, the merchants, and with it
an increased importance of payments in money (as opposed to kind), as well as a higher
demand for contract enforcement and protection.51
Trade occurs within fairs (e.g. Champagne, Lyon, St. Yves) and towns. The latter,
which for long had been mainly used for defensive (fortifications) and religious purposes,
now flourish (Maitland [1897] pag. 196). New ones are founded. Towns become ”non-
feudal” elements within a feudal society (Finer [1997]). Active within these, merchants
are free men in that they are allowed to trade and move, and are not tied to a lord.52
Local Administration and the King’s Revenues. The local fiscal and judicial
administration of England in the eleventh century is based on a strictly hierarchical top-
down structure. The king appoints local officials on the royal domain. These, known
49For an analysis of the feudal society see Bloch [1964].
50See Tait [1936] pag. 131-133 for examples of traded commodities in England.
51According to North and Thomas [1973], this increase in commercial activities leads to formal
agreements replacing informal (or relational) ones. For a formal model see Dixit [2003].
52”City air makes you free” was a contemporary say in Germany. Free men held property (burgage
tenement) and could freely alienate it. On burgage tenure in England see Ballard [1913], and Ballard
and Tait [1923]. In the following we will use the words town, city and borough interchangeably. The
same is true of the corresponding definitions of townsmen, citizens and burgesses.
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as sheriffs, are empowered with judicial and fiscal authority in the shire. Within towns,
officials in charge of performing these duties take the name of reeves (or bailiffs), and
are appointed by either the king or the sheriff.53 Royal officials enforce the law in the
courts of the time, known as the shire-courts, the hundred-courts, and the borough-
courts. Officials are also in charge of collecting the king’s revenues.
Sources of revenues accruing from towns to the king, and different from the oc-
casional gifts (aids, tallages), are constituted by the geld (a land tax), the gablum (a
revenue from the king’s demesne houses), market tolls, receipts from mints, and amends
and forfeitures of the profits of justice (Ballard [1904], pag. 63-64). Receipts from mar-
kets are estimated as being among the largest sources of revenues (Ballard [1904], pag.
90-91). The sum of these revenues constitute the farm of the borough, for which the
sheriff is held accountable to the king’s treasury (the Exchequer).
Local Officials’ Exactions. The contractual arrangement between the king and his
official is known as tax farming : the king sells the sheriff the right to collect his revenues
(among which figures profits from justice) in return for an agreed upon fixed sum. The
official can then retain any exceeding sum he is able to extract from his jurisdictional
area. This arrangement, perhaps not surprisingly, gives strong incentives for local
officials to engage in predatory behavior (Stubbs [1905]). The scotale is a particularly
well-known practice employed by sheriffs to extract payment from townsmen.54 Other
extortionary practices take the form of forced billeting, purveyance, forced loans, and
the impleading of burgesses without an accuser or a witness.55
These practices give rise to complaints (clamores) by townsmen in the twelfth cen-
tury, not only England but in Western Europe in general (Bisson [2008]). During the
53For a thorough analysis of the English administration system in the period of interest see Ballard
[1904], Stubbs [1905], Ballard [1913], and Green [1986].
54See Ballard [1904], pag. xlvii-xlviii, and Stubbs [1905], pag. 703.
55Ballard [1904], pag. xlvii-xlviii, and pag. lxxxv-lxxxvi.
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reign of William Rufus, local officials act in a rapacious manner under the rule of chief
minister Bishop Ranulf Flambard (Stubbs [1905], pag. 342-343). Henry I, intentioned
to put exactions to an end, appoints Bishop Roger of Salisbury as chief minister. His
work is directed toward the creation of a routine-based bureaucracy. Eradicating coer-
cive manners is however not an easy task:
Reflecting back on this time, in what seem to be his own words, Henry
of Huntingdon put it generally and strongly: ”Sheriffs and reeves, whose
office was justice and judgment, were more terrible than thieves and plun-
derers, and more savage than the most savage.” [...] One is reminded of the
Peterborough chronicle which, in its entries for 1094-1105, has a relentless
indictment of fiscal rapacity by kings’ men.56
Although justice is administered for profits, royal sheriffs exploit it to extract even
higher fees. The consequences over the functioning of courts are disastrous: in the
course of the twelfth century the king orders that courts should be held only once a
week ”to prevent burgesses being harassed by too frequent sittings” (Ballard [1913],
pag. lxii).
First Attempts at Limiting Local Officials’ Exactions. The reigns of Henry II
(1154-1189) and Richard I (1189-1999) mark an important change in policy with respect
to royal control over officials. In 1170 Henry II launches the Inquest of the Sheriffs :
sheriffs are investigated by royal justices for their alleged extortionary behavior during
the collection of the gift from towns in provision of the king’s daughter’s wedding (1168-
69). Seventeen or more sheriffs are displaced and their authority is curbed. In 1194,
itinerant royal justices are sent into the shires to further investigate their behavior.
The Iter of 1194 results in the enactment of important provisions; in particular it is
56Bisson [2008], p. 178, and p. 330.
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provided that sheriffs shall no more be justices in their own counties. Furthermore, the
elected office of the coroner is created as a further check on the sheriffs’ judicial power.
Coroners are in charge of keeping pleas of the Crown.57 In 1195 the sheriff is further
discharged from the duty of receiving the oath of peace, his duty now consisting only
of receiving and keeping criminals until the coming of the justices.58
In 1215, the Magna Charta (chapter 24) specifically deals with (and restricts) sher-
iffs’ jurisdictional powers (Merewether [1835], pag, 429). Remarkably, the barons re-
quest that ”sheriffs shall no longer meddle with the pleas of the Crown, without the
coroners” (Stubbs [1905], pag. 601, pag. 680).
Charters. Launching inquests by means of itinerant royal justices is not the only
way twelfth century English kings attempt to keep their officials’ behavior in check. In
1130, Henry I grants the citizens of Lincoln a Charter containing the right to ”hold
their city in chief of the king” in exchange of two-hundred marks of silver and four of
golds (Stubbs [1905], pp. 164). This constitutes the first documented appearance of
the firma burgi : the town (borough) is farmed to burgesses directly rather than to the
sheriff or any other appointed tax farmer. The charter grants burgesses the right to
collect the fixed yearly sum (farm) to be paid to the king’s treasury. The same rights
are granted to London in 1131. There, along with the farm of the city, citizens also
explicitly obtain the right to elect the sheriffs for London and Middlesex. These are the
only two cases of farms granted by Henry I.
Figure 1 below presents a chronology of the grants of the firma burgi to royal and
mesne towns – i.e. towns which are not under the control of the king – occurring in
England during the period 1130-1216. These are new grants: neither confirmations of
57According to Merewether [1835] (pag. 460), the coroner is established as a restraint on extortions
perpetrated by the sheriffs.
58Stubbs [1905] pag. 568-569, pag. 680.
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old grants nor grants to towns which had been their liberties previously revoked are
accounted for in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Grants of Firma Burgi to Royal and Mesne Boroughs: period 1130-
1216.
Legend : Blue: Royal Boroughs - Red: Mesne Boroughs.
Sources: Ballard [1913], Tait [1936].
Notes: No grants are documented before 1130. In some cases we do not have a certain date
for the grant of the charter. However we do have a period within which the charter has been
granted. We have adopted the procedure of selecting the middle year as a date for the charter.
The interested years for royal boroughs are: 1172 (2 charters: 1154-89), and 1207 (1 charters:
1186-1227); for mesne boroughs we have 1141 (1 charter: 1137-45).
After the turbulent reign of Stephen (1135-1154), in which a Civil War breaks out,
the grant of liberties is resumed by Henry II (1154-1189). During this reign seven
additional boroughs receive the same kind of liberties through the granting of charters,
namely Gloucester, Wallingford, Grimsby, Northampton, Bridgenorth, Shrewsbury, and
Cambridge.59 According to Tait [1936] (pag. 174), the grant of liberties to Shrewsbury
and Bridgenorth is possibly connected with the Inquest of 1169-70. These liberties are
59Ballard [1913], pag. cxxxviii-cxlvii, Tait [1936], pag. 176. On his French domain, Henry II grants
the right to a (more) independent system of administration and jurisdiction important commercial to
Rouen and La Rochelle. This system, known as the Etablissement de Rouen, is extended to many
towns in the course of the twelfth and thirteenth century (e.g. Bordeaux, Bayonne) (Giry [1883]).
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nevertheless revocable. London sees its prerogatives being withdrawn during this reign.
This is also true of Gloucester, to which liberties are revoked in 1169-70 after having
attempted to form a commune (Tait [1936], pag. 176-177).
Richard I and John are even more prone to granting Charters. Their pressing need
for money plays an important role: grants by Richard in 1189 are spurred by the need
to raise money for the Third Crusade. Similarly, grants by John are urged by his need
to finance the war with the French king breaking out in 1202.60
Towns pay in order to be granted liberties, and often agree to pay an increment
on the yearly farm previously paid by the royal sheriff.61 By the end of this period
(1216), we register 37 grants among circa 145 royal boroughs (even though some of
them no longer possess these prerogatives by the arrival of the Magna Charta).62 We
view the towns’ eagerness to pay to have sheriffs be withdrawn from their walls as
further evidence of local officials’ misbehavior.
In this period, two changes occur concerning the nature of the granted liberties.
First the farm becomes perpetual, although still subject to revocation. In 1190 York
is farmed by the citizens: liberties are however revoked six months later upon citizens
reneging on the payment promised to the king (Tait [1936], pag. 179).63 Second, many
charters explicitly grant the right of electing boroughs’ officials in charge of financial
and judicial administration (e.g. reeve, coroner).64 However, according to Ballard and
Tait, this is not an additional right as towns enjoy it upon the grant of the firma burgi,
60See Stubbs [1905], pag. 698-699, and Tait [1936], pag. 176-177.
61See Tait [1936] pag. 184 for data on the amount of the farm and the increment paid by boroughs
in the period 1066-1199.
62See Table 2 below. Our main data sources on liberties granted to towns for the period 1066-1216
are Ballard [1913] and Tait [1936].
63During the reign of Richard I, liberties are withdrawn from Lincoln, Cambridge and Southampton
(Tait [1936], pag. 176-180).
64For instance, see the Charter granted by John to the burgesses of Ipswich in 1200. The grant
of liberties may also involve the election of bureaucrats more directly in charge of the enforcement of
commercial contracts. In 1286 Henry III grants to the citizens of London the right to appoint four or
five of their number to try ”pleas of merchandise” (Gross [1906], p. 239).
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whether it is explicitly stated in the charter or not.65
A deeper investigation of the content of the charters of liberties sheds light on one of
their main purposes. Townsmen are eager to gain control over the financial and judicial
machinery of the town so as to exclude the jurisdiction of the sheriff.66 This is formally
done by means of the non-intromittat clause: townsmen have the right to be subjected
to the Borough court only, which is itself run by elected officers. Sheriffs (running the
shire-court) lose jurisdiction over towns.67
Subsequent to the baronial revolt and the Magna Charta, the grant of liberties
to towns is resumed by Henry III and Edward I. Less important towns are however
concerned by this new wave of grants as major towns already possess liberties (Ballard
and Tait [1923], pag. lvi).
Figure 2 below presents a chronology of the grants of the firma burgi to royal and
mesne towns occurring in England during the period 1217-1307. These are new grants:
neither confirmations of old grants nor grants to towns which had been their liberties
previously revoked are accounted for in Figure 2.
The relative weakness of the Crown in the years preceding the Provisions of Oxford
and the baronial revolt led by Simon de Montfort in 1263 plays a role during the grants
of the years 1255-57. Importantly, these grants include the right for towns to return
royal writs: this right acts as a further restraint on sheriffs’ jurisdiction, as they are no
longer allowed to enter the town to enact royal orders.68
Royal appointed officials do not cease to be a problem. In 1274-75 Edward I
launches an Inquiry in order to investigate their behavior. In 1285 the Statute of
Westminster II is passed, containing provisions concerning extortions perpetrated by
65See Ballard [1913], pag lxxxvi-lxxxvii, and Tait [1936], pag. 186.
66Merewether [1835], pag. 124, and pag. 467. Ballard [1904], pag. 91-93. See also Stubbs [1905],
pag. 482, and pag. 699-700.
67See Ballard and Tait [1923], pag. lxi. See also Ballard [1913].
68Ballard and Tait [1936], pag. xvii-xviii. Rather than judicial writs, towns are anxious to enact
the ones related to the summons of the Exchequer (Ballard and Tait [1936], pag. lxii-lxiii).
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Figure 2: Grants of Firma Burgi to Royal and Mesne Boroughs: period 1217-
1307.
Legend : Blue: Royal Boroughs - Red: Mesne Boroughs.
Sources: Ballard [1913], Ballard and Tait [1923].
Notes: In some cases we do not have a certain date for the grant of the charter. However we
do have a period within which the charter has been granted. We have adopted the procedure
of selecting the middle year as a date for the charter. The interested year for royal boroughs
is 1278 (1 charter: 1262-93); for mesne boroughs we have 1279 (1 charter: 1277-82), and 1282
(1 charter: 1272-91).
the sheriffs (chapter 13). Edward I’s charters are still motivated by the wish to restrain
officials’ behavior.69 An additional office also arises: some towns are allowed to elect
mayors.70 This figure symbolizes the autonomy of the town (Reynolds [1977] pag.
108-109, Reynolds [2004]). According to Tait [1936], mayors come along with the right
for townsmen to impose taxes on themselves for municipal purpose.71
69Merewether [1835], pag. 488-490. During this period many towns see their liberties revoked: for
instance Dunwich in 1268 and 1293, Ipswich in 1284 and 1291, Newcastle-upon-Tyne in 1294, Norwich
in 1281m Nottingham in 1284 (Merewether [1835], pag. 464, pag. 512-513, pag. 524-529).
70But see our discussion on the London commune and the election of a mayor in the last decade
of the twelfth century. The mayeur is present in fourteenth century Flanders also. The mayeur is
nominated by the echevins (Giry [1877], p. 171).
71Tait [1936], p. 298.
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Towns not under Direct Control of the King. As Figure 1 and 2 show, if kings
in England are willing to grant growing liberties to towns during the course of the
twelfth and thirteenth century, the same seems not to be true of local lords collecting
tolls and administering justice in the mesne towns.72 These towns are rarely farmed
by the burgesses (Tait [1936], pag. 191). Of the sample of circa 120 mesne towns we
document, only one (namely Richmond in 1137-45) is put at farm by 1216 (Ballard
[1913], pag. lxxix). By the end of the period of interest (1307), we document 11 grants
in total among mesne towns (see Table 2).73
Mense lords seem more prone to grant the right to elect an officer (most of the
times a reeve) though. In the period following the first baronial revolt (1215-17), we
document 22 such grants in boroughs not farmed by their burgesses. The grant of the
right to elect a reeve is similar but narrower in scope with respect to the firma burgi,
which gives right to appointment of different types of local officials. In general, kings
appear to rely significantly more on the grant of the borough at farm rather than on
the grant of election rights over single officials.
Table 2 shows a summary of the number of farms granted by overlords to burgesses
in the period of interest. Our data on the liberties granted to boroughs are mainly in
Ballard [1913] for the period 1066-1216, and in Ballard and Tait [1923] for the period
1216-1307. We integrate these data with the work by Merewether [1835] and Tait
[1936]. Moreover, these works however only contain a list of boroughs that are granted
charters in the period of interest. We integrate these list by adding all the towns listed
72During the period of interest some of the royal towns are mediatized, i.e. they are held both by
the king and a (local) lord, most of the times an Earl. In this case each tax recipient employs his own
officials to collect taxes. According to the third-penny rule, the Earl has the right to collect a third of
the borough’s revenues. We know of no charters granted by an Earl having rights to the third penny.
See Ballard [1904], pag. 37.
73Table 2 does not take the grant to Helston into account as it seems to be a royal borough at the
time of the first grant.
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Table 2: Boroughs and Farms by Burgesses. England and Wales 1066-1307
Period Royal Mesne Uncertain
Number of Boroughs
1066-1216 145 119 6
1216-1307 144 122 6
Number of Farms to Burgesses
1066-1216 37(*) 1 0
1216-1307 16(**) 10(*) 0
Sources: Merewether [1835], Maitland [1897], Ballard [1904], Ballard [1913], Usher [1920],
Ballard and Tait [1923], Stephenson [1933], Tait [1936].
Notes: Liverpool and Newcastle-under-Lyme are listed as Royal Boroughs in the period 1066-
1216, and as both Royal and Mesne Boroughs in the period 1216-1307. Helston is listed as a
Royal Borough in the period 1066-1216, and as a Mesne Boroughs in the period 1216-1307.
The number of listed farms are new grants only.
(*): Helston is granted at farm to burgesses by the king in 1201, and by a Mesne lord in
1260.
(**): Helmsley is granted at farm in circa 1186-1227: we include the farm in the period
1216-1307. Also, Ballard and Tait [1923] list Helmsley, Newport (Isle of W.) and Sheffield as
Mesne boroughs at the beginning of the period 1216. Tait [1936] however does not include
them among the Mesne boroughs at farm. Also, according to Merewether [1835] (pag. 458-
59), Bristol is farmed to its burgesses in 1226, but we have no confirmation of this grant in
Ballard and Tait [1923]; therefore, we do not include it among the royal boroughs at farm.
in the Domesday Book (1086) (available in Ballard [1904]).74 Also, we add boroughs
listed by Usher [1920], Stephenson [1933] and Tait [1936].
Table 3 shows a summary of the boroughs which are granted the right to elect an
officer (usually a reeve, but coroners and mayors are also included). As in Table 2, we
distinguish between Royal and Mesne boroughs, and we divide our period of interest
in two subperiods.75
As Table 2 makes clear, grants of boroughs at farm to their burgesses by mesne lords
are less numerous and arrive at a later point in time. The last recipient of taxes (i.e.
the mesne lord) being closer, misbehavior by the appointed official is less likely to be a
problem. This removes one of the main functions charters accomplish. Also, boroughs
74Bruton and Seasalter are excluded from the list of boroughs as they lose their (borough-)status
shortly after the compilation of the Domesday Book.
75The list of boroughs and liberties provided by Ballard [1913] and Ballard and Tait [1923] distin-
guished between Royal and Mesne boroughs. A complete dataset is available from the authors upon
request.
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Table 3: Officers Elected and Non-intromittat Clause. England and Wales 1066-1307.
Period Royal Mesne Uncertain
Election of Officers: Number of Grants
1066-1216 1 6(*) 0
1216-1307 14 22 0
Non-intromittat Clause
1066-1216 3 1 0
1216-1307 30 6 0
Sources: Merewether [1835], Ballard [1904], Ballard [1913], Ballard and Tait [1923], Tait
[1936].
Notes: The table includes only boroughs which are granted the right to elect an officer
without being farmed by their burgesses. Two boroughs, namely Bury-St.-Edmunds and
Nether Weare, are granted the Non-intromittat Clause without any further liberty.
in the hands of local lords are mostly small and with no trade connection, which further
lowers the scope for employing officials in charge of enforcing the (merchant) law.76
In 1292 the citizens of Liverpool have reasons to complain in answer to a writ
Quo Warranto: ”they explained that at present they had no bailiff of their own (de
se), Earl Edmund of Lancaster, their lord since 1266, having put in bailiffs of his
own appointment and prevented them from having a free borough”. As in Liverpool,
Newcastle-under-Lyme becomes under direct control of the mesne lord’s and sees its
liberties – previously granted by the king – immediately revoked.77 At Leicester,
probably the largest of the mesne towns, reeves are elected in 1276-77 only. The
burgesses of Leicester are granted the (revocable) right to farm the lord’s revenues in
1375.78
Our historical account shall stop at this point. To sum up, chartered towns have
spread throughout all the English territories (mostly between the twelfth and the thir-
teenth century) following the revival of trade, and in response to widespread arbitrary
malfeasance by rulers’ officers. Rural manors also are sometimes granted the farm
76On seigneurial boroughs’ trade connection see Ballard and Tait [1923], pag. lxxxii.
77Ballard and Tait [1923], pag. lvi.
78Tait [1936], pp. 191-192.
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and/or the right to elect reeves by the overlord.79 However bailiffs and stewards do not
cease to be appointed by the lord as a check on elected reeves and constables (Usher
[1920], pag. 128-130). Charters made towns more autonomous and, therefore, less
exposed to coercive exactions. Urban liberties in England reach a complete structure
by the fourteenth century (Reynolds [1977]). Arguably, the early autonomy granted to
towns in England, along with the expansion of trade and the need to wage wars, played
a role in the creation of nation wide representative assemblies.80
6 Conclusions
In this paper we propose a novel and formal theory linking the rise of trade to the
joint evolution of political and market institutions. In order to provide law enforcement
(i.e. market institutions) for the citizenry to produce and trade, a ruler (i) heavily in-
vests in a bureaucracy capable of coercion and (ii) creates a system of peaceful taxation.
Such a high investment however potentially paves the way to coercive expropriation by
bureaucrats. By delegating control over the bureaucracy to the (naturally) better in-
formed citizenry – say the merchant class – the ruler lowers the cost of investing in
market institutions. By means of political institutions society achieves a more efficient
level of law and order.
Absent the need to provide law and order – say absent gains from trade – a ruler
does not find it profitable to relinquish power to the citizenry: citizens’ informational
advantage is not valuable to the ruler as she can keep the bureaucracy’s behavior in
check via controlling its size. Furthermore, delegation to the citizens improves their
79See Tait [1936], pag. 251. However we have no detailed information neither on their number nor
on the time of the arrival of such liberties.
80See Stasavage [2011] for the role played by war financing (and sovereign debt in general) in the
birth and evolution of nation wide representative assemblies. See Willard [1934] and Hodgett [2006]
on the evolution of taxation in England in the thirteenth and fourteenth century. See Finer [1997] for
the history of Parliaments in England, France and Spain.
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ability to escape taxation.
We motivate our formal theory by investigating the institutional dynamics in post-
Norman Conquest England. Eleventh century England is feudal: political power is
concentrated in the hands of territorial lords, either the king or a local seigneur. In
parallel with the rise of trade, power-holders develop a system of law enforcement by
hiring increasingly numerous local officials. This change however goes hand in hand
with episodes of extortionary behavior by appointed officials. In their effort to restrain
misbehavior, kings develop systems of auditing. Eventually, by the middle of the twelfth
century, kings increasingly give in to the citizens’ desire of (limited) self-governance.
By means of Charters, rulers grant citizens the right to farm their town, which formally
amounts to the right of appointing and firing local law enforcers and tax collectors.
Although this spread of liberties is fostered by the rulers’ need to wage wars, we
document that control over local officials is an important determinant of the dynamics
of political and market institutions. Overlords distant from tax collection points (e.g.
the king) are for instance more prone to delegate authority to towns than local lords.
In this paper our ambition was to provide a rationale for a fundamental historical
evolution of institutions in England. In so doing we offer a new perspective on the
potential role played by trade in shaping political and market institutions. By letting
citizens handle the local bureaucracy themselves, a more efficient and stronger bureau-
cracy can be sustained at a lower cost. The consequent higher supply of law and order
in turn implies a higher creation of wealth.
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Appendix 1
This Appendix includes the implications of the technical assumption A1 and all
the proofs.
Technical Assumption: A1 implies the existence of the following threshold in a
trade economy: given ∀uM ∈ (0, y),
∃ q̂(uM) : y(q) ≤ f(q) + uM ,
for q ≥ q̂(uM).81 We have q̂(uM) non-increasing in uM . Unless needed, we suppress the
argument uM when referring to q̂(uM).
Proof. Proposition 1: Consider I = R. The surplus’ maximizing quantity q∗(c) is
given by the FOC:82
yq(q) = c. (14)
Define now:
qmax = arg max
{q∈R+}
y(q)− f(q),
as the quantity that maximizes U when T˜ (q) = f(q). A1 ensures the existence of a
unique qmax. In a manorial economy we have q∗ = qmax = 0.
We divide the analysis by distinguishing a manorial from a trade economy. Consider
first a manorial economy in which y(q) = y. The solution to R’s problem, defined as
81The equality holds for q = q̂(uM ).
82When referring to the functions y(q) and f(q), subscripts indicate the derivative with respect to
the argument of the function.
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qs(c), is given by:
max
{q∈R+}
f(q)− cq,
s.t. y − f(q) ≥ uM .
It is straightforward to show that we generally have an over-investment in q with respect
to the efficient level, i.e. qs(c) > q∗ = 0.
Now consider R’s maximization problem in a trade economy. The solution to R’s
problem, still defined as qs(c), is given by:
qs = arg max
{q∈R+}
f(q)− cq,
s.t. y(q)− f(q) ≥ uM ,
where A1-A2 imply that the solution to this problem is constrained, with q̂ < q∗(c).
In order to verify PC, R distorts her optimal choice of q by moving her investment
toward qmax (i.e. R decreases her investment). In this case R sets qs = q̂ ≥ qmax.
To summarize, R’s investment as a function of the type of economy considered is
given by:
• qs(c) ≥ q∗ = 0 if a manorial economy;
• qs(c) ≤ q∗(c) if a trade economy.
When considering the political institutional choice, since taxation is equal to coercive
extraction, political institutions do not affect the cost of inducing coercive extraction.
Therefore R never finds it profitable to grant political institutions. In fact, if R were to
set I = M , M would optimally sets qsM(c) = q
∗(c) and makes a zero transfer (tM = 0)
to R independently of the type of economy considered.
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Proof. Lemma 1: Consider the case in which t˜ > f(q˜). This implies that q˜ < q(t˜).
Therefore the cost of hiring each single officer is equal to c. The only case we need to
investigate is the one in which min[y(q˜), f(q˜)] = f(q˜). We have:
[f(q˜)− cq˜] + βR
1− βR [f(q
s)− cqs] < [t˜− cq˜] + βR
1− βR [f(q
s)− cqs].
Moreover, from PC(R) we also have:
[t˜− cq˜] + βR
1− βR [f(q
s)− cqs] ≤ [t˜− cq˜]
1− βR ,
then, by combining the two inequalities, we obtain:
[f(q˜)− cq˜] + βR
1− βR [f(q
s)− cqs] < [t˜− cq˜]
1− βR ,
that is, we recover ICC(R).
Conversely, consider the case in which t˜ ≤ f(q˜) instead. Assume min[y(q˜), f(q˜)] =
f(q˜). When ICC(R) holds we have:
[t˜− C(t˜, q˜)]
1− βR ≥ [f(q˜)− cq˜] +
βR
1− βR [f(q
s)− cqs] ≥ [t˜− cq˜] + βR
1− βR [f(q
s)− cqs],
and where:
[t˜− cq˜] + βR
1− βR [f(q
s)− cqs] ≥ [t˜− C(t˜, q˜)] + βR
1− βR [f(q
s)− cqs],
These two chains of inequalities finally give:
t˜− C(t˜, q˜) ≥ [f(qs)− cqs],
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i.e. we recover PC(R). When min[y(q˜), f(q˜)] = y(q˜), it is straightforward to show that
the inequality continues to hold.
Also the same reasoning holds if y(q˜) = y.
Proof. Lemma 2: Let us define the solution to (13) in terms of both the transfer and
the investment as {tr, qr} (where r stands for repeated). From this FOC it is clear that
we have:
• qr ∈ [0, qˇ(c)] and
• tr = βM [y − U s] + (1− βM)f(qr),
where U s is M ’s utility in the one-period game, and where qˇ(c) is defined as the solution
to R’s one-period problem when PC is disregarded, i.e.:
qˇ(c) = arg max
{q∈R+}
f(q)− cq. (15)
Further recall that we have q∗ = 0.
We need to show that all the constraints hold. We define the solution to R’s problem
verifying all the constraints as {tR, qR}.
First we consider PC(R) and ICC(R). The proof for PC(R) is trivial. It is enough
to observe that R can choose q = 0: whenever qR 6= 0 it has to be the case that she
gets a higher payoff. Moreover, notice that we have tr ≥ f(qr): then ICC(R) holds by
Lemma 1.
We now turn to PC. Depending on the value of c we can have two cases: (i) qˇ(c) ≤ q̂,
and (ii) qˇ(c) > q̂.
In case (i) we also have qs(c) = qˇ(c). PC is rewritten as:
(1− βM)[y − f(qr)] ≥ uM − βMU s.
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Since qr(c, βM) ∈ [0, qˇ(c)] it is easily checked that PC holds. This follows immediately
from the fact that the RHS in the previous inequality is lower (or equal) than (1 −
βM)uM .
Consider now case (ii). We have qs = q̂. Then PC is rewritten as:
(1− βM)[y − f(q)] ≥ (1− βM)uM ,
implying that PC holds iff q ≤ q̂. Two subcases can arise:
• qr(c, βM) ≤ q̂. Then qR = qr(c, βM); or
• qr(c, βM) > q̂. Then qR = q̂ so as to verify PC.
In the second case all the constraints hold as equalities. This finally establishes that
qr(c, βM) ∈ [0, qs(c)].
Finally, we have that the higher βM , the closer q
r(·) to efficiency. To verify this last
point, from (13) we have that:
∂qr
∂βM
=
f(qr)
∂q
SOC
< 0,
where SOC stands for Second Order Condition.
Proof. Lemma 3: Let us define the constrained solution to R’s problem as
qr(c, c, uM , βR). The unconstrained solution is defined as q
◦(c, c).
From PC we have t = y(q)− uM . Therefore, we have q(t) = qs = q̂ in (4).83
Recall from (4) that the cost function has a kink at q = q̂ < q∗(c) (see Proposition
1). Given (4), we have that q◦(c, c) < q∗(c), where q◦(c, c) (also) maximizes the surplus
when the cost of investing in the bureaucracy is given by (3). We have two main cases:
83Given A1, there are two solutions to the equality y(q)− uM = f(q), namely q̂l and q̂h. We focus
on the highest root, since we have t = y(q)− uM < f(q) for q > q̂h.
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(i) q◦(c, c) > q̂;
(ii) q◦(c, c) = q̂.
Consider case (i). R is interested in moving the investment away from qs = q̂ toward
q◦(c, c). We define q as the value of q such that:
y(q) = f(q),
where q = q̂(uM) when uM = 0.
Two subcases can occur, namely:
i.1 q > q◦(c, c),
i.2 q ≤ q◦(c, c).
Consider first case i.1, i.e. we have min[y(q), f(q)] = f(q), for q = {q̂, q◦}. Then,
when q = q◦, from (4) and the RHS in (11) we get:
βR =
uM − [y(q◦)− f(q◦)] + [c− c](q◦ − qs)
[f(q◦)− cq◦]− [f(qs)− cqs] . (16)
If βR ≥ βR, R binds PC and the solution qR = q◦(c, c) verifies ICC(R). We then
have tR = [y(q
◦)− uM ].
When βR < βR, ICC(R) binds. We write ICC(R) as:
y(q)− uM − cqs − c(q − qs) ≥ (1− βR)[f(q)− cq] + βR[f(qs)− cqs]. (17)
Recall that yq(q) < fq(q) for q ≥ qmax, where qmax is defined in the proof of Propo-
sition 1, and where qmax ≤ q̂ (from A1-A2). Also the solution to R’s problem is not
greater than q◦(c, c) and not lower than q̂ (since at q̂ all the constraints trivially hold).
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Hence, as we move q downward, ceteris paribus the difference between the LHS
and the RHS in (17) increases until verifying ICC(R). When ICC(R) binds we have
qR = q
r(c, c, uM , βR) ∈ [q̂, q◦(c, c)], which is non-decreasing in βR.
When considering case i.2, it is straightforward to show that the same procedure
holds. The only difference consists in the fact that, when ICC(R), q has to be suffi-
ciently lowered so that the area in which min[y(q), f(q)] = f(q) is reached.
Finally, in order to show that these outcomes are indeed the solution to this subgame
(absent political institutions), we need to verify if the disregarded constraints hold.
We first check for ICC(M). By binding PC, ICC(M) is given by:
y(q)− uM ≤ βM{[y(q)− f(q)]− uM}+ f(q),
that is written as:
y(q)− f(q) ≤ uM ,
that holds for q ≥ q̂. Since the solution qR lies within the interval [q̂, q◦(c, c)], ICC(M)
holds.
Finally, ∀q ∈ [q̂, q◦(c, c)] we have t = y(q) − uM ≤ f(q). Therefore, by Lemma 1
PC(R) also holds.
When case ii is considered, the solution is trivially given by qR = q̂.
Proof. Proposition 2: Let us start with the analysis of the Manorial economy, i.e.
consider y(q) = y. When Iτ = R, R incurs a cost c for hiring each single officer.
Let us define as qM the investment in the bureaucracy undertaken by player M in
period τ when Iτ = M . Recall that, if Iτ = M , R cannot take political institutions
back until period τ +1. At the beginning of period τ +1, R can costlessly take political
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institutions back. Then, we show that M cannot commit to repay R a (per-period)
sum so that she is indifferent between Iτ = M and Iτ = R.
Our objective is to show that, when Iτ = M any movement toward efficiency gen-
erates a lower utility for R with respect to the case in which Iτ = R.
Consider the following two-phase strategy played by R. Cooperation phase: grant
institutions in any period. Punishment phase: do not grant political institution and
play the equilibrium of the finitely repeated stage game. R starts with the cooperation
phase in period τ , and switches forever after to the punishment phase whenever M
transfers her a sum tτ lower than V R(c) = [tR− cqR], where {tR, qR} is given by Lemma
2.84
If political institutions are taken back in any period τ , play Yτ = y if y−f(qτ ) ≥ uM ,
and play Yτ = 0 otherwise.
In a manorial economy, the temptation to renege rests on M .
Consider then Iτ = M . For R to weakly prefer Iτ = M to Iτ = R, M has to commit
to transfer R the following sum:
tM(c) ≥ V R(c) ≡ tR − cqR,
where V R(c) is R’s per-period payoff when political institutions are not granted, and
where the pair {tR, qR} is given by Lemma 2.
M sustains the cost cqM of investing in the bureaucracy (of size qM) when granted
political institutions. In order to prove that political institutions are not a profitable
choice for R, we show that the strategy-pair above described can not induce M to pay
a transfer t(c) ≥ V R(c) to R in any period τ .
First notice that R can not deviate at any stage. Given the above-mentioned strate-
84It is straightforward to notice that the equilibrium in the one-period game gives the minmax of
M ’s payoff.
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gies and R’s inability to coercively extract any positive sum from M , if M were to de-
viate and transfer R a sum lower than V R(c), he would optimally invest qM = q
∗ = 0.
Hence, in order for M not to deviate, the following ICC(M) has to hold:
y − V R(c)
1− βM ≥ y +
βM
1− βM U
s,
and where M sets qM = q
∗ = 0. We now show that, for every qM ∈ [0, qR], M strictly
prefers deviating rather than staying in the cooperation phase.
Compare the above-mentioned strategy by R to the one played in Lemma 2, i.e.
absent political institutions. In Lemma 2 also, R punishes M – when not receiving an
adequate transfer – by reverting to the equilibrium of the finitely repeated game. The
two subgames only differ in that M gets a higher deviation payoff when Iτ = M . In
fact, if Iτ = M , M ’s payoff from deviating is given by y, which is greater than y−f(qR),
i.e. the payoff he gets when deviating in period τ if Iτ = R instead.
Hence, we conclude that ICC(M) is violated ∀qM ∈ [q∗, qR) provided tM ≥ V R(c).85
To summarize, in a manorial economy no political institutions arise, i.e. I˜ = R,
and the equilibrium pair {t˜, q˜} is given by {tR, qR} as defined in Lemma 2.
Consider now the case of a Trade economy. If Iτ = R, as in the previous case, for
R to weakly prefer Iτ = R to Iτ = M , M has to commit to:
tM(c, βR) ≥ V R(c, , βR) ≡ tR − C(qR),
where V R(c, βR) is R’s per-period payoff in a trade economy absent political institutions.
85Any movement toward efficiency violates ICC(M). We show this by contradiction. Assume M
is weakly better off when playing qM ∈ [q∗, qR) and transferring tM = tR − cqR rather than reneging
and induce coercive extraction. Then we should have qR = qM (i.e., from Lemma 2, R could have
induced this more efficient investment even absent political institutions), a contradiction.
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V R(c, βR) is computed in Lemma 3 along with {tR, qR}.
When institutions are granted, M sustains the cost cqM of investing in the bu-
reaucracy. R’s two-phase strategy has been previously defined, and the temptation to
deviate rests on M when Iτ = M . Following any deviation by M , R and M revert to
the equilibrium in the one-period stage game forever after.
We first consider M ’s payoff when not deviating on the transfer to be made to R.
In each period τ , M solves the following problem:
max
{t,q}
y(q)− cq − t (18)
t ≥ V R(c, βR),
The constraint ensures that R is willing to grant political institutions in each period τ .
From the program in (18) it is easily seen that M optimally invests qM = q
∗(c).
The grant of political institutions (Iτ = M) in every period τ is an equilibrium if
M does not find it profitable to deviate, i.e. if:
y(q∗)− cq∗ − V R(c, βR) ≥ (1− βM)[y(q∗)− cq∗] + βMuM ,
were (ICC(M)) takes into account the possibility for M to set his own preferred level
of investment when deviating. Since R cannot induce coercive extraction in stage 4, it
is straightforward to show that, even when deviating, M ’s optimal investment is given
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by q∗(c).86 (ICC(M)) is written as:
βM [y(q
∗)− cq∗ − uM ] ≥ V R(c, βR). (19)
A sufficiently long-sighted M is needed to make political institutions a subgame
perfect equilibrium. Also, all else equal, the more short-sighted R and the higher c, the
lower V R(c, βR) and, therefore, the more likely political institutions are to arise.
86The optimal investment is derived by assuming M ’s marginal cost of investing in the bureaucracy
is c even when deviating on the transfer to R. In light of our analysis in the Technical Appendix
this may not be true: since M looses appointment rights in future periods, appointed officers may be
tempted to keep the higher possible amount of the collected tax proceeds. This may result in a higher
wage for officers. We here avoid this possible effect since it does not affect our results in any major
way. More specifically, taking this effect into account makes political institutions more likely since it
bridles M ’s temptation to deviate.
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